Psychology,
and Scientific Methods, vol. 13 (1916) % See, e. g., E. V. Huntington, these Transactions, vol. 5 (1904), p. 288; H. M. Sheffer, ibid., vol. 14 (1913), p. 481; B. A. Bernstein, ibid., vol. 17 (1916) , p. 50. ** Boole states inaccurately (Laws of Thought,-^. 159) that the formal laws underlying his theory of primary propositions are identical with those underlying his theory of secondary propositions. Schröder is mistaken in thinking (Vorlesungen, pp. 51-52) that by adding to any postulate set for the class logic a postulate to the effect that the logic consists of two elements, a set of independent postulates will thereby be obtained for the propositional logic. Whitehead and Russell's set of primitives for their "theory of deduction" (Principia Mathemalica, vol. 1, ) is imperfect. The authors fail, among other things, to give a satisfactory discussion of the independence of the primitive propositions (see a later footnote).
ft See Vorlesungen, § §21-31.
XX Schröder and other mathematical logicians do not distinguish between the symbols <, +, X that belong to the propositional logic (either as primitive ideas or as ideas defined by means of the primitive ideas) and the notions "implies," "or," "and" respectively that are outside the logic. Thus if a, b, c are elements of our logic and "<" the relation of "implication" belonging to the logic, then we have the proposition (i) If a<b and b<c, then a<c.
472
License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see https://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use Four sets of postulates are obtained. If we denote by K a class of elements and by +, X, | the operations of logical addition, multiplication, rejection* respectively, the undefined notions in the sets are K,+,X; K,\; K,+; K.
(For convenience aXb will be written a • b or ab.) The postulates in these sets are in number respectively five, four, three, one. As will be seen, the first two sets are more than a mere selection from corresponding postulate sets for the general logic of classes. The fourth set is quite novel. It consists of a single postulate involving a single undefined notion, the notion of class. For each set, the complete existential theory! of the postulates is established, Tables I, II, III exhibiting the existential theories of the first three sets. In these tables the signs +, X at the head of the columns are enclosed in circles, in order to distinguish them from the arithmetic +, X employed in the concrete systems found in the body of the tables. In the Or, writing "implies" for "<", we have (ii) If "a implies b" and "b implies c," then "a implies c." But Schröder (Vorlesungen, p. 28) would write (ii) in the form (in) [(o<i)X(i<c)]<(a<c), where the "if . . . then" and "and" of (ii), which are outside the logic, are replaced by the symbols "<" and "X" of the logic. It is this confusion between the symbols of the logic of propositions and notions outside the logic that leads Schröder (Vorlesungen, pp. 45-48) to go through a lengthy explanation of why the duality principle that exists in the logic of classes breaks down in the logic of propositions when, as a matter of fact, it does not break down! It is the failure to differentiate properly between the symbols of the prepositional logic and notions outside the logic that causes Whitehead and Russell in their Principia, vol. 1, to hold (p. 94) that the theory of propositions is more fundamental than the theory of classes and (p. 95, footnote) that the recognized methods of proving the independence of a set of postulates are inapplicable to the primitive propositions of the logic of propositions. If P is the set of postulates of any mathematical science 2, and Q the body of propositions deducible from P, then, as Russell has well said somewhere, the science 2 is simply the proposition "P implies Q." Now the relation "implies" in this proposition is outside 2, even if 2 is the logic of propositions in which a relation "< " of "implication" is involved. Indeed, the notions "proposition," "negation," etc. and the syllogism, the law of contradiction,etc. are all used in unsymbolized forms in deducing these very laws symbolically from an appropriate set of postulates for the logic of propositions. The unsymbolized forms of these notions and laws belong to a general logic, a sub-logic, underlying the logic that is receiving symbolic treatment. And there is no circularity in all this. On the contrary, one must recognize a sub-logic as underlying any symbolic logic, if he is to avoid circularity. The recognition of this sub-logic is essentially the observance of Russell's own principle, used by him so effectively in the solution of paradoxes, the principle that no collection may contain the collection itself as a member. And so, proper differentiation between the symbols and laws of a propositional logic and the corresponding ideas and laws of its sub-logic would lead to the exclusion from the set of primitive ideas and primitive propositions for the propositional logic of the Principia notions such as "assertion" and propositions such as "Anything implied by a true elementary proposition is true." The resulting set of primitives would not be in the least more fundamental for logic than a set of primitives for the logic of classes, and the usual methods of proving independence would be applicable to it.
* [July concrete systems, an operation followed by "mod 3" (or "mod 2") denotes the least positive integer obtained from the operation by dropping multiples of 3 (or 2).
2. Set I. Postulates in terms of addition and multiplication.
The following postulate set for the logic of propositions is modeUed after Huntington's first set* of ten postulates for the general logic of classes. It leaves undefined class K and operations +, X, and it exhibits the law of duaUty in the logic. Note that postulates 3, 4 are not found in Huntington's set.
1. There is a isT-element 0 such that 0+a = a for every if-element a.
2. There is a iC-element 1 such that 1 • a = a for every isT-element a. 
a+bc = (a+b)(a+c).
For 0+bc = bc = (0+b)(0+c), by 1, 1; l+&c = l = l • l = (l+&)(l+c), by 4, 2, 4. The non-existence (indicated by blanks) of systems having the characters (-+ -+ +), (± -± -+) is in accordance with the evident facts that postulate 3 cannot be contradicted if postulate 1 is denied, and that postulate 4 cannot be contradicted if postulate 2 is denied. For (0')' = 1' = 0 by def., def.; (l')' = 0' = l, by def., def.
f. la = a. For la=(l'+a')' = (0+a')' = (a')' = a, by def., def., a, 4. 6. 0 • a = 0. For 0 • a = (0'+a')' = (l+a')' = l' = 0, by def., def., ß, def.
10. Complete existential theory of Set III. The complete existential theory of Set III is given by Table III following. The set is seen to be completely independent. * E. H. Moore, loc. cit. t E. V. Huntington, loc. cit. Postulates 1-5 of Set I then follow, so that postulate P is sufficient for our logic.
12. A new principle in postulate theory. The procedure employed in § 11 makes evident the following new principle in postulate theory: // a system is finite, a single postulate, expressed in terms of the single undefined notion of class, is sufficient for the system. University of California,
